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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employees’ 
right to engage in activities necessary to vindicate their right to 
collectively bargain. This includes the rights of unions to truthfully 
inform the public about an employer’s activities and to deploy 
organizers to inform workers of their right to organize. Neither the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) nor the Supreme Court has 
read the NLRA as giving an advantage to employees over employers 
within the potentially adversarial union organizing process. 
Accordingly, employers’ entrepreneurial and property rights, 
particularly state property rights, limit the scope of rights granted by 
the NLRA. At the same time, two doctrines of federal labor law’s 
preemption of state law, termed Garmon and Machinists preemption, 
circumscribe the ability of state legislatures and courts to interfere in 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, December 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.A., History and Philosophy, University of Illinois at 
Chicago. I would like to thank Professors Hal Morris, Martin Malin, and Mary Rose 
Strubbe. My colleagues Jennifer Nimry Eseed, Prava Palacharla, and Donald Caplan 
were critical in helping me produce this paper. I would also like to thank Waleeta, 
Marlin, and Yousip for all their support. 
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Congress’ comprehensive regulatory scheme over industrial 
employment relations.  
In Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit correctly enforced a 
NLRB charge against a supermarket employer who excluded 
nonemployee union organizers from property near its stores, property 
over which the company held an easement but did not own. The 
organizers were engaged in truthful informational leafleting about the 
employer’s labor practices. In enforcing the order, the court, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lechmere v. NLRB, considered 
whether the employer’s easement, granted by its lessor, gave it a 
“power to exclude” the organizers, and took up, though ultimately 
rejected, the employer’s defense based on statutory and common law 
grants of authority to easement holders.  
This inquiry was unnecessary because the NLRA should preempt 
any such defense. The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify 
the purpose and operation of the NLRA’s grant of rights to 
nonemployee organizers: if the employer cannot claim a trespass, the 
organizers may not be excluded so long as they are otherwise acting 
lawfully; and any state grant of authority to the contrary should be 
preempted by the NLRA under Machinists preemption. 
This Comment will support that contention over the next four 
sections. First, Section I will discuss the facts and outcome of the 
Seventh Circuit case, Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, in which the court 
considered an employer’s appeal of an NLRB charge of violating § 
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Next, Section II will trace the development of 
the jurisprudence surrounding employees’ and nonemployees’ § 7 
rights and exclusion from property. In Section III, the Garmon and 
Machinists preemption doctrines are taken up, looking ultimately at 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States v. Brown, striking down a California statute that impermissibly 
interfered with Congress’ scheme of keeping employer and employee 
speech a “free zone” for the interplay of opposing forces. Finally, 
Section IV draws on the analysis and discussion in the preceding 
sections and argues that no state statute or common law rule could 
grant easement-holding employers a right to exclude otherwise lawful 
2
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§ 7 hand-billers or organizers because of the preemption doctrines and 
Lechmere’s limited concern with trespass. 
 




Roundy’s, Inc. operates more than two-dozen groceries
1
 in 
southeastern Wisconsin under the name Pick’n Save. In the spring of 
2005, the Milwaukee Construction and Trades Council (“the Union”), 
an association of construction workers union locals, deployed 
organizers to these Pick’n Save stores to distribute leaflets to 
consumers, urging them to boycott the stores in protest of Roundy’s 
failure to retain union contractors or pay prevailing union wages to 
workers constructing and remodeling their stores.
2
 The hand-billers 
were not attempting to organize Pick’n Save employees into a union—
they were already unionized—nor were they attempting to discourage 
nonunion construction workers from crossing a picket line,
 3
 two 
relevant inquiries under the NLRA.
4
 Instead, the leafleting was 
                                                 
1
 See Pick’n Save Store Locator, http://www.picknsave.com/StoreLocator.aspx 
(last visited 10 June, 2013). 
2
 Roundy's Inc., Respondent & Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Council, Afl-Cio, 
Charging Party, CASE 30-CA-17185, 2006 WL 325760 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges 
Feb. 8, 2006). 
3
 Id. (“Let me begin by stating what this case does and does not involve. It does 
not involve organizing activities, either by employees or non-employee union 
representatives. And it does not involve a bargaining dispute between union-
represented employees and their employer. It deals with nonemployee union 
representatives publicizing a dispute between a union and an employer over using 
contractors, in the construction or remodeling of its stores, who do not adhere to area 
wage standards.”). 
4
 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the rights of employees 
of employers engaged in interstate commerce to engage in “concerted activity” for 
the purpose of “mutual aid and protection.” Truthfully informing the public about an 
employer’s labor current relations and outreach to employees by nonemployee union 
organizers are considered protected by § 7 as derivative rights. For the purposes of 
this comment, protected § 7 activity, including handbilling and communication with 
employees (but excluding more technical areas such as “recognitional picketing,” 
3
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intended to pressure Roundy’s to require union contractors be used for 
its stores, or to require prevailing wages be paid to its nonunion 
contractors.
5
 This type of organizing activity is protected by the 
NLRA and the legal analysis is the same as if the organizing activity 
was for the purposes of organizing a new union.
6
 Roundy’s leases all 
but one of its Milwaukee-area locations,
7
 many of which are situated 
in shopping strips,
8
 and had therefore initially claimed that they did 
not have control over contracting decisions.
9
 However, in his findings, 
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Roundy’s retained 




Roundy’s management responded to the handbilling effort by 
having supervisors and managers order the organizers off the property, 
or have the police called to eject them. The Council filed an unfair 
labor practice (“ULP”) charge with the National Labor Relations 
Board, specifically alleging that the Union’s rights under § 7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to engage in organizing 
activity was unlawfully infringed, in part because Roundy’s lacked the 
requisite property interest to exclude the organizers from the 
property.
11
 The Union alleged that § 8(a)(1) of the Act
12
 was violated 
as a result of the unlawful exclusion.  
                                                                                                                   
etc.) is referred to “organizing activity.” See e.g., J.E. Macy, Annotation, Rights of 
Collective Action by Employees as Declared in § 7 of National Labor Relations Act 
(29 USCA § 157), 6 A.L.R.2d 416 (1949) (“Employer who promulgated and 
discriminatorily enforced no-solicitation rule barring nonemployee union organizers 
from meeting with off-duty credit center employees in cafeteria, and who threatened 
police action and engaged in unwarranted surveillance of protected union activities, 
violated employees' rights…”). 
5
 Roundy's Inc., 2006 WL 325760. 
 
6
 See infra note 13. 
7
 Roundy's Inc., 2006 WL 325760. 
8
 Id. (“At some of the locations, Respondent's store was in a shopping mall and 






 Roundy’s Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 674 F.3d 638, 643 (7th 
Cir.2012). 
12
 National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006). 
4
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Where employee or nonemployee union organizers are excluded 
from private property, the NLRB and federal courts consider as a 
threshold issue whether the employer in fact had a property right 
sufficient to exclude people from the premises.
13
 If the employer 
lacked a property interest sufficient to exclude parties, that exclusion 
would infringe protected § 7 organizing-like activities, and thus violate 
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act. Only the property and entrepreneurial rights of 
the employer limit the protections of the NLRA, the federal law 
governing labor relations. So for example, a sole tenant in a shopping 
mall who evicts nonemployee organizers leafleting on a sidewalk 
abutting the street (which they do not own) would presumably not 
have a property interest in the sidewalk differentiated from that of the 
general public, and thus would lack an exclusionary property right.
14
 
Their eviction of organizers would violate § 8(a)(1).
15
  
In the Roundy’s case, the NLRB, after two rounds of fact finding 
by an ALJ, found that the language of Roundy’s leases did not grant 
the stores easements sufficient to exclude parties from common areas, 
such as parking lots and sidewalks. Therefore, the Board found that 
the exclusions of the handbilling organizers infringed on the Union’s § 
7 rights and violated § 8(a)(1).
16
 Roundy’s appealed the Board’s 
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
17
   
The court considered a number of issues raised on appeal, 
including whether the Board’s remanding to the ALJ for more fact-
finding on the property interest was appropriate considering the 
Board’s General Counsel had failed to properly raise the property 
interest issue; whether a legal authority on Wisconsin state property 
law was an appropriate “expert” under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and Board precedent; and whether, as a substantive matter, Roundy’s 
easements, created by the language of the lease and interpreted by 
                                                 
13
 Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 535 (Year) (reiterating that “in 




 The jurisprudence underlying this doctrine is discussed more fully in Section 
III; see discussion infra Section III. 
16
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B. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis. 
 
Roundy’s ultimately failed to allege a sufficient property interest 
to exclude the organizers under a combination of state common and 
positive law. This was because Roundy’s easement, granted through a 
lease, did not give Roundy’s an interest sufficient to exclude parties 
from those easements. Had Wisconsin courts been more charitable to 
easement holders—or had the Wisconsin legislature positively granted 
easement holders a cause of action for trespass even absent a fee 
simple—the case may have gone the other way. The problem lies 
therein. 
The Board, an administrative agency created by the NLRA, is 
entrusted with interpreting the Act and is entitled to appropriate 
judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.
19
 However, where the Board must interpret and apply state 
law to arrive at a decision, that analysis is subject to review de novo.
20
 
In reviewing the Board’s decision in this case, the court acknowledged 
that in leafleting exclusion and organizing activity cases a union may 
prevail on either (a) a disparate treatment theory or (b) on the grounds 
that the employer lacked a sufficient property interest to exclude.
21
  
In disparate treatment cases, the Board or a reviewing court will 
consider whether the employer treated union activity differently from 
other analogous activities—such as political or charitable speech—that 
are permitted.
22
 This analysis is unnecessary, however, where the 
excluding party lacks an initial right to exclude; it is thus a threshold 




 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
20
 Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 646 (citing United Food & Commercial Workers 
Int’l Union Local 400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C.Cir.2000) (reviewing de 
novo Board's determination of whether employer had sufficient property interest to 
exclude union organizers because Board has no special expertise in interpreting 
Virginia law). 
21
 Id. at 645.  
22
 Id. at 644-45.  
6
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 Determining the nature of a party’s property interest is a 
matter of state property law, and is often common law, an area in 
which the Board lacks “special expertise.”
24
 In such cases, the 
reviewing court is charged with trying to determine how a state 
supreme court—in this instance the Wisconsin Supreme Court—
would rule on the issue. In Roundy’s, state property law defined the 
rights of easement-holders using this analysis.
25
 
To determine whether Roundy’s had a property interest sufficient 
to exclude anyone from the common areas where the hand-billers 
stood, the court looked first to the language of the leases to determine 
the type of easements
26
 granted to Roundy’s by the property owner. 
The use of the terms “easement” and “lease” may be confusing, so a 
brief explication may be helpful. Roundy’s, like many retail 
employers, particularly in suburban settings, does not own all of the 
property in which their store is situated—they lease a building only. 
However, the lessor (the property owner) grants them an “easement” 
in the language of their lease. This easement permits their use of the 
parking lot, berms, loading areas, etc. They need this easement so that 
their licensees and invitees—their customers primarily—can access 
the building. But they do not own these portions of the property; they 
simply have an easement for its use, along with the other tenants and 
the property owner.
27
 Easements should be understood as a right to use 




 Id. at 646.   
25
 Id. at 655 (citing to Blood v. VH-1 Music First, 688 F.3d  543, 546-47 (7th 
Cir.2012)). 
26
 The Board’s and court’s focus on easements is of particular importance in 
this case. Easements are flexible and can confer on the recipient a wide variety of 
property interests, not necessarily inclusionary: “An easement is a property interest 
that grants a nonexclusive right or privilege to possess or make use of someone else's 
lands. It may be obtained by contractual grant, by factual or legal implication from 
the intention of the parties or other circumstances of the transaction, or by an adverse 
use during a statutorily prescribed period.” See, e.g., James L. Buchwalter, 
Annotation, What Constitutes, and Remedies for, Misuse of Easement, 111 
A.L.R.5th 313 (2003).  
27
 The court reproduced the language found in the majority of leases in 
question: “Tenant is hereby granted a nonexclusive easement, right and privilege for 
itself and its customers, employees and invitees and the customers, employees and 
7
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property that is not otherwise owned, and the nature of the use is 
determined by the terms used in the language of the easement and state 
law. 
The court adopted the details of Roundy’s easements in leases as 
found by the ALJ.
28
 While they differed in some details, the easements 
were essentially nonexclusive easements that “generally permit use of 
the common areas by [Roundy’s] and its customers, employees and 
invitees, as well as the landlord and other tenants of the shopping 
centers, and their customers, employees and invitees.”
29
 The right to 
permit use of common areas is obviously not coextensive with a right 
to exclude.
30
 This limitation/fact can be inferred from the language of 
                                                                                                                   
invitees of any subtenant, concessionaire or licensee of Tenant to use the [common 
areas] without charge with Landlord and other tenants and occupants of the 
Shopping Center and their customers, employees and invitees; provided, however, 
no use of the [common areas] shall be made which detracts from the first-class 
nature of the Shopping Center or obstructs access to or parking provided for 
customers of the Shopping Center.” Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 643. 
28
 Roundy's Inc., Respondent & Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Council, Afl-Cio, 
Charging Party, 30-CA-17185R, 2007 WL 966762 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 
28, 2007) (“[Twenty-five of the 26 store] locations were subject to different lease 
agreements between different landlords and Respondent, which leased the stores 
themselves, not the common areas in front of the stores, where the handbilling took 
place. The details of the relevant language of the lease agreements are set forth in a 
stipulation of the parties during the remand hearing (Jt. Exh. 4). Although the parties 
differ on whether the Respondent has an exclusionary interest in the common areas 
where the handbilling took place, there is essential agreement that Respondent had a 
nonexclusive easement in those common areas. Most of the leases specifically 
provide that the lessee has a nonexclusive easement in the common areas, including 
the sidewalks immediately in front of the stores and the parking lots serving the 
leased premises, and the others implicitly provide as much. The Respondent 
concedes (Opening brief on remand, at 2 and 37-39) that the leases at all 25 leased 
locations granted it “non-exclusive easements to the common areas.” The easements 
generally permit use of the common areas by Respondent and its customers, 
employees and invitees, as well as the landlord and other tenants of the shopping 




 Roundy's Inc., 674 F.3d at 651 (quoting Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. 
Jackson Cnty., 785 N.W.2d 615, 621 (2010)) (“An easement creates a nonpossessory 
right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor 
not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”). 
8
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the easements; if Roundy’s had a right to exclude of the type imputed 
to full property rights, Roundy’s could feasibly exclude the customers 
of other tenants from sidewalks and the parking lot, and by the 
language of the easement this plainly could not be the case. This is 
what is meant by the term “nonexclusive”; where the easement holder 
does not have an absolute right to exclude third parties from the 
easement. 
While the Seventh Circuit looked at how other courts of appeals 
had treated nonexclusive easements in similar cases,
31
 Supreme Court 
precedent from Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB required the court to look at 
the particular state’s interpretation of property rights.
32
 Relying on 
several cases from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately determined that the language of the easements did not 
confer on Roundy’s a right to exclude from common areas,
33
 and thus 
violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act.
34
  
In so doing, the court took up Roundy’s defense that a Wisconsin 
statute, §§ 844.01 et seq., gave them a cause of action where their 
property interest, including that in an easement, had been injured 
through some type of interference.
35
 While the court rejected this 
argument, it failed to address whether such a statute—or, indeed, the 
state supreme court cases construing the exclusionary interests of 
easement-holders—would be applicable anyway given doctrines of 
preemption of federal labor law over state regulations and causes of 
action, known as Garmon and Machinists preemption.
36
 




 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992). 
33






 Fed. Lab. Law: NLRB Prac. § 3:4 (“[M]ost courts divide the preemption 
doctrine along a bright line, articulating two distinct NLRA preemption principles. 
The first, the so-called Garmon preemption, prohibits states from regulating activity 
that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits….The second 
preemption principle, the so-called Machinists preemption, precludes state and 
municipal regulation concerning conduct that Congress intended to be 
unregulated.”). 
9
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Instead, the court focused on the substantive deficiency of the 
relied-upon statute. The court stated that the statute did not create an 
independent cause of action granting a right, but only a remedy where 
a sufficient right existed (presumably by the express terms of the lease 
and easement).
37
 The court thus rejected the employer’s proffered 
defense, saying, “Section 844.01(1)…doesn't create an independent 
cause of action; it is a remedial and procedural statute that sets forth 
the remedies available when a cause of action exists…. In other words, 
Section 844.01 only provides remedies for persons who are injured as 
a result of an interference with their interests in real property.”
38
 The 
court then looked to whether, under Wisconsin state law, Roundy’s 
had suffered an “unreasonable interference” with their easement: 
“Because Roundy's has rights to the extent of its nonexclusive use in 
the easements, it can enjoin third parties when they unreasonably 
interfere with this use.”
39
 After looking at how other circuit courts had 
treated the question, the court returned to Wisconsin state law and 
determined that, given the ALJ’s findings that the hand-billers were 
peacefully engaged in their activity in a way not obstructive to 
Roundy’s business operations, they were “not unreasonably 
interfering with Roundy’s use and enjoyment of its easement.”
40
 The 
exclusion of the hand-billers thus interfered with the Union’s § 7 
rights and violated § 8(a)(1). The court enforced the Board’s order 




The court’s analysis reflects the drift of jurisprudence controlling 
employer property rights and workers’ organizing rights under the 
NLRA. By drifting with that post-Lechmere jurisprudence, the court 
missed an opportunity to rectify the problem by considering how 
                                                 
37
 Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 652.  
38
 Id. (citing Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis.2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778, 
782 (Wis.Ct.App.1996); Shanak v. City of Waupaca, 518 N.W.2d 310, 320 
(Wis.Ct.App.1994) (stating that Section 844.01 “creates no rights or duties. It does 
not purport to create a cause of action. It is a remedial and procedural statute.”)). 
39
 Id. at 653(citing Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis.2d 338, 254 N.W.2d 282, 285 
(1977)). 
40
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federal preemption doctrines could come into play in these scenarios. 
The following section traces the Lechmere genealogy, before a 
consideration of federal labor law preemption.  
 
II. LECHMERE’S GENESIS AND SUBSEQUENT DRIFT 
 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regulates employee 
organizing activity.
42
 These organizing rights are at the heart of the 
NLRA and are referred to metonymically as § 7 rights. They were 
originally conceived to encourage unionization and collective 
bargaining through organizing activities, and to ensure that employers 
could not unduly interfere with that process. Since its passage in 1935, 
interpretation of the NLRA has evolved and it is not currently 
construed as favoring one party over another.
43
 Employee and 
nonemployee organizers’ rights to physically access employees are 
based on state, not federal, law because state law defines “property”.
44
 
Thus, where federal rights interact with property rights, state 
definitions of property law will be employed. 
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court 
determined that a state may “exercise its police power or its sovereign 
right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more 
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”
45
 The 
Supreme Court in PruneYard held that state law defines a defendant’s 
property rights in an expressive activity case.
46
 The Court affirmed 
                                                 
 
42
 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935). 
 
43
 Chicago labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan shares an anecdote of a young 
attorney who applied for a job with the NLRB; when the attorney questioned which 
side the Board was on in the struggle between employers and employees, the 
interviewer said, “We’re neutral…but we’re neutral on the side of the workers.” 
THOMAS GEOHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 265-66 (1991).  
 
44
 See e.g., New York New York Hotel, 334 NLRB 761 (2001). 
45
 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (On the 
interaction of property rights and First Amendment protected speech). 
46
 Id. (“Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the 
several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define ‘property’ in 
the first instance.”). 
11
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and explicated this principle in the labor context in Thunder Basin 
Coal Co. v. Reich in note 21, stating “[t]he right of employers to 
exclude union organizers from their private property emanate[s] from 
state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the 
NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it.”
47
 
The Court struggled with how the Act’s creation and guarantee of 
organizing rights for workers and unions interacted with an 
employer’s property rights. There seemed to be an intractable 
contradiction: the very nature of workers’ rights to organize one 
another, discuss unionization, and appeal to the public and other 
workers to recognize labor disputes requires some interference, if not 
outright use, of the employer’s property; at the same time, a federal 
statute that seriously burdened employers’ property rights would 
implicate any number of constitutional issues. Beginning with 
Republic Aviation v. N.L.R.B., through Babcock & Wilcox v. N.L.R.B., 
Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., and culminating in Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
the Court moved along a gentle slope from recognizing that the 
employees’ organizing rights necessarily limited an employer’s 
property rights, to giving preference to those property rights in large 
categories of cases.  
 
A. Analogy to First Amendment 
 
 One strain of the jurisprudence, rooted in First Amendment 
free speech rights, started strong but fizzled out. In Marsh v. Alabama, 
the Court held that a company-owned town could not prohibit 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from proselytizing on a property-rights theory.
48
 
The Court rejected the contention that property rights granted 
“absolute dominion” to curtail First Amendment rights.
49
 This was 
particularly the case where the private property had first been opened 
to the public and First Amendment expression successively curtailed.
50
 
The Court extended this theory to the labor rights context in 
                                                 
47
 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217, n. 21 ((1994)). 
48
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Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, Inc.
51
 The Court expressed a policy concern that businesses 
migrating to strip malls and business parks in suburban contexts 
“could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating 
a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores,” if employers 
could rely on property rights to curtail the First Amendment 
expression necessarily entailed in § 7 organizational rights.
52
 The 
Court applied the reasoning of Marsh, that given the essentially public 
nature of a shopping center, no meaningful privacy-sourced concern 
over property rights could justify exclusion.
53
 
 The progress made on a constitutional theory wedding, or at 
least analogizing, § 7 rights to free speech began to ebb back down the 
slope with the Court’s decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. Lloyd was a 
Vietnam protest case where the Court distinguished Logan Valley and 
Marsh on the grounds that anti-war speech was unrelated to the nature 
of the property (a shopping mall), and thus courts should not force 
property owners to tolerate the speech.
54
 Subsequently, in Hudgens v. 
NLRB,
55
 the Court short-circuited any further expansion of Logan 
Valley into the labor context: “[T]he rationale of Logan Valley did not 
survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case.”
56
 Union protesters 
could not enter a shopping mall for the purpose of advertising their 
strike against one tenant.
57
 Logan Valley having conclusively 
smothered any First Amendment free speech theory for § 7 rights, the 
expression of those rights is analyzed under its own labor law rubric. 
 
                                                 
51
 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 




 Id.; see also  Catherine Lockard, Note, Gaining Access to Private Property: 
The Zoning Process and Development Agreements, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 
775-76 (2003). 
54
 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
55
 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
56
 Id. at 518. 
57
 Id. at 520-21. 
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B. Republic Aviation Through Lechmere 
 
Outside this truncated thread of cases, the Court otherwise treated 
the question of employee and nonemployee organizer access to or use 
of employer property within a narrower labor law context, eschewing 
any free speech analysis. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,
58
 the 
Court enforced a Board order invalidating the employer’s blanket 
prohibition against any solicitation as violative of employees’ § 7 
rights, even though the prohibition was not discriminatorily applied.
59
 
In its essence, the Court’s holding created an employer duty to 
accommodate employees’ protected § 7 activity even on its own 
property.  
This duty would not encompass too much, however. In 1956, the 
Court decided N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, holding 
that an employer had no duty to permit nonemployee organizers to 
access its (wholly owned) parking lots for purposes of § 7 activities, 
where the plant was near to small communities where employees 
lived, and thus many other means of publicity and organizing were 
available.
60
 A non-discriminatory policy against access by 
nonemployee organizers in particular was therefore enforceable. The 
Court in dictum stated that, “Organization rights are granted to 
workers by the same authority, the National Government, that 
preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be 
obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the 
maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirmatively 
interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the 
employer aid organization.”
61
 The effect of Babcock was that the 
NLRA would not create a duty on the employer to accommodate 
nonemployee organizers’ organizing activities (i.e., “aid[ing] 
organization”) if the union has any other options for contacting 
employees.  
                                                 
58




 N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
61
 Id. at 112. 
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Of course, later Courts would locate the source of property rights 
in the states, not the “National Government.” While differentiating 
between employee and nonemployee organizers and explicating the 
property rights of employers vis a vis § 7 rights, the Court reiterated 
that § 7 rights are important enough that they must trump at least one 
element of an employer’s property rights: “when the inaccessibility of 
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by 
nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, 
the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the 
extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to 
organize.”
62
 This caveat/exception is important because it confounds 
the idea that employer property rights are absolutely sacrosanct—or 
that § 7 rights are inherently inferior to those property rights. 
Hudgens, discussed supra, was decided subsequent to Babcock and 
explicated the general rule that employers’ rights to exclude trumped 
nonemployees’ § 7 organizing rights.
63
 Thus situated, some deeper 
discussion of Hudgens is appropriate. Also a shopping center case, 
employees of a retailer in a shopping mall entered the mall to picket in 
support of an economic strike. They were threatened with arrest if they 
did not disperse. The union filed a complaint with the Board alleging 
abridgment of § 7 rights and a violation of § 8(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s subsequent cease-and-desist 
order. The Supreme Court reversed that order, on the grounds that the 
shopping mall owner (the Petitioner, Scott Hudgens) was under no 
duty to accommodate the striking workers. Hudgens’ primary effect 
was to cleave access/accommodation cases under the NLRA from any 
First Amendment constitutional analysis.
64
 The bulk of the opinion is 




 It may be helpful to think of nonemployee organizers § 7 rights as rights 
derived from employees’ organizational rights under § 7—i.e., as derivative rights. It 
is often union organizers who inform employees of their rights under the Act and aid 
them in organizing their workplace and therefore if nonemployee organizers do not 
have these “derivative” rights, employees would be unable in many cases to 
effectively exercise their own organizational rights. 
64
 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-521 (1976) (“While acknowledging 
that the source of the pickets' rights was s 7 of the Act, the Court of Appeals held 
that the competing constitutional and property right considerations discussed in 
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directed at that issue. It also however reinforced the Babcock 
distinction between employees and nonemployees and reiterated that 
accommodation was only to be an undesirable recourse where the 
union did not have a means of access, stating that “[t]he Babcock & 
Wilcox opinion established the basic objective under the Act.”
65
 In 
what was later determined to be dicta, however, the Court restated at 
least the premise for a balancing test between § 7 rights and 
employers’ property rights, putting the “locus of that 
accommodation…at differing points along the spectrum depending on 
the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property 
rights asserted in any given context.”
66
 
The Board initially took this to be instruction to implement a 
balancing test in cases of employee or nonemployee organizers 
accessing employer property for protected § 7 activities. This idea 
culminated in the Board’s decision in Jean Country.
67
 Jean Country, 
like the Hudgens and Logan Valley cases discussed supra, dealt with a 
shopping center, demonstrating just how important massive enclosures 
of space and the concentration of various service-sector employers in 
single locations has become to federal labor law jurisprudence.
68
 In 
Jean Country, a union attempted to place an “informational picket,” 
letting consumers know that a retailer, Jean Country, was non-union, 
at the entrance to the store inside the mall.
69
 The store and mall 
management contacted the police to remove the picketers.
70
 The Board 
adopted the ALJ’s findings and applied a balancing test to determine 
whether the removal of the picketers infringed on § 7 rights and thus 
                                                                                                                   
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra, ‘burde(n) the General Counsel with the duty to prove 
that other locations less intrusive upon Hudgens' property rights than picketing 
inside the mall were either unavailable or ineffective,’ 501 F.2d, at 169, and that the 
Board's General Counsel had met that burden in this case.”). 
65




 Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).  
68
 The importance of shopping centers also vindicates the Court’s concern in 
Logan Valley. 
69
 Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14-16.  
70
 Id. at 15. 
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 The Board concluded on the basis of that 
balancing test that the exclusion was unlawful: 
 
Taking account of all the factors above, it is apparent that strict 
maintenance of the privacy of the mall property during 
business hours is not an overriding concern and in fact is not 
generally desirable, because the presence of the public in large 
numbers is intrinsic to the commercial goals of the lessees and 
Respondent Brook. Accordingly, we find that the private 
property right asserted by the Respondents in reaction to the 
Union's picketing is quite weak in the circumstances.
72
 
 Jean Valley and balancing wouldn’t last long. 
 
C. The Lechmere Decision 
 
The Supreme Court finally had an opportunity to take on the 
balancing test issue squarely in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.
73
 Lechmere 
arose as a result of the United Food and Commercial Workers’ 
(“UFCW’s”) attempts to organize the employees of a retail 
establishment in Connecticut.
74
 Finding it difficult to contact workers 
by standing on a four-foot grass easement abutting a major arterial 
road, organizers for the union leafleted employee cars (generally 
identifiable by where and when they parked); in each instance, 
management for the store removed the leaflets and ordered the 
organizers to leave. The UFCW pursued a charge with the NLRB 
alleging abridgement of § 7 rights.
75
 The Board applied the Jean 
Country/Babcock balancing test and ruled in the union’s favor.
76
 
Lechmere appealed, and the Court granted certiorari.
77
  
                                                 
71
 Id. at 16 (“With the Respondents' interests established, we proceed to an 
examination of the relative strength of their right to maintain the privacy of the 
property.”). 
72
 Id. at 17. 
73
 Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
74
 Id. at 529. 
75
 Id. at 529-30. 
 
76
 Id. at 531. 
 
77
 Id. at 531. 
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Demonstrating just how much the details of property ownership 
had crept into determinations of workers’ rights under the Act, the 
Court described in great detail the physical characteristics of the 
property on which the retailer was located.
78
 The Court rejected the 
Board’s use of the Jean Country balancing test and created a rather 
broad and simple categorical rule: an employer may exclude 
nonemployee organizers from its property where the employer has a 
property interest sufficient to exclude, and employees may be reached 
by any other means.
79
  
The Court in an opinion by Justice Thomas framed this rule as a 
simple return to Babcock, relegating the “spectrum” language from 
Hudgens to the dreaded dicta dustbin. The Court stiffened Babcock’s 
general preference for employer property rights where any alternative 
means of contact were available to nonemployee organizers, without 
concern for the unworkability of employees’ § 7 rights absent 
nonemployees’ derivative rights to organize them. However, Hudgens 
did not stand for an eroding of Babcock; instead, in its disposition it 
left Babcock’s central holding in place, reiterating that “Babcock's 
language of ‘accommodation’ was [not] intended to repudiate or 
modify [the] holding that an employer need not accommodate 




                                                 
78
 Id. at 531 (“The store is located in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza, which 
occupies a roughly rectangular tract measuring approximately 880 feet from north to 
south and 740 feet from east to west. Lechmere's store is situated at the Plaza's south 
end, with the main parking lot to its north. A strip of 13 smaller “satellite stores” not 
owned by Lechmere runs along the west side of the Plaza, facing the parking lot. To 
the Plaza's east (where the main entrance is located) runs the Berlin Turnpike, a four-
lane divided highway. The parking lot, however, does not abut the Turnpike; they 
are separated by a 46–foot–wide grassy strip, broken only by the Plaza's entrance. 
Lechmere and the developer of the satellite stores own the parking lot jointly. The 
grassy strip is public property (except for a 4-foot-wide band adjoining the parking 
lot, which belongs to Lechmere).”). 
79
 Id. at 538 (Only in scenarios where, for example, employees were wholly 
isolated or resided on property owned by the employer, as on remote oil rigs or 
mining operations for example, would the Jean Country balancing test be 
considered.). 
80
 Id. at 534. 
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Lechmere created a stark categorical rule, one crafted in relief 
against a darkly impermissible alternative: the federal government 
compelling employers to suffer common law trespass. The Court cast 
this categorical rule as a commonsensical result: absent such a rule, § 
7 would otherwise be interpreted as suborning common law trespass. 
That is, the Court’s reference to “reasonability” of accommodation in 
earlier cases “was nothing more than a commonsense recognition that 
unions need not engage in extraordinary feats to communicate with 
inaccessible employees—not an endorsement of the view…. that the 
Act protects ‘reasonable’ trespasses.”
81
 Whereas employee organizers 
are the employer’s invitees or licensees, nonemployee organizers have 
no such status. Thus, per Lechmere, a reading of § 7 requiring some 
accommodation of employees’ activities would not unduly interfere 
with state property rights. The categorical distinction was for the Court 
an easy one to make; employees have a status under common law that 
nonemployees do not, thus accommodation commensurate with that 
status upsets nothing. 
As Justices White and Blackmun pointed out in their dissent, 
however, this seductive bit of argumentation falls flat upon closer 
inspection of the facts, but at a slightly greater level of generality. That 
is, whereas the parking lot involved in Babcock was for use 
exclusively by employees and abutting a well-settled area,
82
 the 




The analogy to trespass thus doesn’t survive when employed to 
justify a categorical distinction between employees and 
nonemployees; while nonemployees may seem out of place in a 
parking lot otherwise used only by employees and the occasional 
licensee, as in Babcock, in a parking lot that is open to the public 
without any real limitation,
84
 nonemployees are perfectly expected, in 
fact outright encouraged to be present?. They could hardly be 
analogized to trespassers. What’s more, as the dissenting Justices 
                                                 
81
 Id. at 537. 
82
 N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956). 
83
 Lechmere Inc., 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting). 
84
 E.g., there is no controlled access to the parking lot. 
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pointed out, the employees’ § 7 rights often rely inextricably on 
nonemployee organizers, as the Babcock decision itself points out.
85
 
The Court’s categorical distinction between employees and 
nonemployees
86
 and the faulty analogy to trespass has triggered a drift 
in the jurisprudence that conflates employers’ state law-defined “right 
to exclude” with employees’ § 7 organizational rights, giving 
preference to the former even where the facts of a given case don’t 
raise the specter of compelled trespass. 
 
D. The Post-Lechmere Approach 
 
The result of Lechmere on handbilling and similar organizing 
activity cases has been to create a fairly simple formal inquiry: did the 
employer have a property right, as defined by state law, to exclude? If 
so, any exclusion of nonemployees is appropriate. If not, any 
exclusion violates § 8(a)(1) of the Act (presuming otherwise lawful 
behavior by the nonemployees).
87
 The employer’s right to exclude 
therefore is not a right conferred by the NLRA itself. Instead, the right 
as defined by state law defeats the § 7 rights of employees and the 
derivative rights of nonemployee organizers.
88
  
As the Roundy’s case shows, the inquiry may be simple in form, 
but it can be complex in practice. The Board must interpret state 
common law on property rights, not an area of expertise it has, and 
reviewing courts must approximate how a state supreme court “would 
                                                 
85
 Lechmere Inc., 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J. dissenting)(“Moreover, the Court 
in Babcock recognized that actual communication with nonemployee organizers, not 
mere notice that an organizing campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate § 7 rights.”) 
(citing to Babcock, 351 U.S., at 113) (emphasis added). 
86
 Lechmere is often cited for its proposition that § 7 does not confer rights on 
nonemployees, only employees (see e.g., Davis Country, Inc. v. NLRB 2 F.3d 1162 
(D.C.Cir. 1993)). Because “employee” is a term defined by the NLRA, it is left to 
the Board to interpret its meaning, see N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Electric, 516 
U.S. 85 (1995) (holding that an employee simultaneously employed by a union is 
still an employee for the purposes of the Act).   
87
 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 
47 B.C.L.REV. 891, 905 (2006). 
88
 See e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217, n. 21 (1994). 
20
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 The result has been that employees seeking to 
express their § 7 organizational rights are subject to the sometimes 
nebulous—sometimes quirky—vagaries of state property law. A few 
cases can demonstrate this odd drift away from the purpose of the 
NLRA. That purpose is to comprehensively define and regulate 
industrial relations and to protect rights of employees to organize. The 
post-Lechmere jurisprudence has drifted towards allowing expression 
of that purpose only where the employer must permit § 7 expression. 
After Lechmere was handed down, reviewing courts had little 
trouble disposing with organizer access cases.
90
 However, the 
jurisprudence became more difficult when the property interest was 
not clear. The Board and reviewing courts could not merely rely on 
Lechmere because the right to exclude was not a NLRA right, but a 
state common law right.
91
 So in cases involving an unclear property 
interest, the Lechmere analysis turns on a reading of state property 
law, which is inherently unstable for two reasons: first, because the 
Board lacks expertise in state property law; and second, because 
reviewing courts do not defer to the Board’s interpretation of state 
property law, but must review the Board’s conclusion de novo.
 92
 
States’ plenary authority to codify property rights by statute also raises 
the possibility that state legislatures can alter the governing regimes 
from time to time.
93
 Moreover, the fact that federal courts have a 
                                                 
89
 Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638 at 651 (7th Cir. 2012). 
90
 See e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992); Frye 
v. District 1199, Health Care and Social Services Union, Service Employees Intern. 
Union, AFL-CIO, 996 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993); N.L.R.B. v. Great Scot, Inc., 39 
F.3d 678 (6th Cir.1994); Metropolitan Dist. Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity 
United Broth. Of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 68 F.3d 
71 (3rd Cir. 1995); Johnson & Hardin Co. v. N.L.R.B., 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir.1995). 
91
 See e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994); N.L.R.B. v. 
Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). 
92
 Hirsch, supra note 87, at 906-07 (“The Board’s interpretation of a lease, 
construction of a state’s treatment of public rights-of-way, or factual determination 
of where the organizers were standing will either trigger Lechmere and make the 
employer’s attempt to exclude lawful, or evade Lechmere and make the exact same 
attempt unlawful. This analysis is frustrating for the parties, as they cannot 
reasonably predict, ex ante, the Board’s determination of the state law issue.”). 
93
 See discussion infra Section III. 
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historical doctrinal aversion to adjudicating land use cases in the first 
place, diminishing their own expertise, aggravates the situation.
94
 
Several cases illustrate the challenge for the Board and reviewing 
courts created by Lechmere and its progeny.  
In O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers’ 
Union, Meatcutters Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC, the Eighth Circuit 
declined to overturn a Board order finding that the employer, a grocer, 
had violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act, subject to further proceedings on the 
issue of the employer’s property interest.
95
 The employer in that case 
had evicted “area-standards” hand-billers engaged in § 7 activities like 
those of the hand-billers in Roundy’s.
96
 The O’Neil’s Markets court 
began its analysis by looking to the language found in the lease 
agreements.
97
 In its analysis, the court stalled its application of 
Lechmere because of uncertainty as to whether that precedent could be 
applied directly where the employer “does not own the parking lot or 
sidewalk at issue.”
98
 Citing to a similar though less thoroughly 
discussed case from the Sixth Circuit, the court inquired into the 
precise nature of the employer’s property interest as defined by its 
lease and interpreted by state courts.
99
  
The analysis in O’Neil’s Markets is keen if a bit unwieldy. The 
court stated that because per the terms of the lease the employer had a 
“non-exclusive easement of ingress, egress, and parking,” more 
                                                 
94
 See e.g., Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention 
Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1135-36 (1980) (“Although the [Supreme] Court 
reentered the land use field in the 1970s, its disposition of the recent cases has 
tended to discourage federal land use litigation. The volume of land use litigation in 
the lower federal courts has increased in recent years, but a variety of procedural and 
substantive devices, including abstention, have been invoked to discourage land use 
litigants from entering federal court.”); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 
U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (federal courts should not sit as “zoning 
board[s] of appeal.”). 
 
95
 O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union, 
Meatcutters Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC, 95 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1996). 
96




 Id. at 737. 
99
 Id. at 738-39 (citing to Johnson & Hardin Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 690, enf’d, 49 
F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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evidence or law would be needed for the employer to carry its 
persuasive burden proving that it had a property interest sufficient to 
exclude the hand-billers.
100
 Evidence offered by the employer that it 
was responsible for maintenance of the common areas was insufficient 
to create a property interest not otherwise explicit in the lease, at least 
insofar as no case authority was offered to support that conclusion.
101
 
Instead, the court looked to a contract interpretation case for the 
proposition that in cases of ambiguity of interests conferred, only the 
text of the lease could be relied upon.
102
 What’s more, Missouri 
common law explicitly debarred “easement owners” from trespass 
remedies,
103
 which impliedly conflicted with Lechmere’s particular 
concern with suborned or “reasonable” trespass.
104
 The court therefore 
remanded the case for further proceedings on whether the picketing 
was truly protected activity with the presumption that if it were, the 
Petitioner would be liable for a violation of § 8(a)(1).
105
 
Obviously, different states ascribe different degrees of interest or 
rights to easement holders. The Snyder’s of Hanover case
106
 
demonstrates the quirkiness of this fact. In this unreported and 
complex case out of the Third Circuit, the court reversed a Board 
order
107
 finding that the employer Snyder’s of Hanover, a 
Pennsylvania pretzel-maker, had violated § 8(a)(1) when it called 
police to eject UFCW hand-billers from the public right-of-way at the 
edge of its factory’s driveway.
108
 The route to that conclusion was a 
circuitous one. 
                                                 
100




 Id. (citing Washington Univ. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 801 S.W.2d 458, 
464 (Mo.Ct.App.1990). 
103
 Id. at 739 (citing Gilbert v. K.T.I., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 289, 293 
(Mo.Ct.App.1988). 
104
 See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992). 
105
 O’Neil’s Markets, 95 F.3d at 740. 
 
106
 Snyder’s of Hanover v. N.L.R.B., 39 Fed.Appx. 730 (2002). 
 
107
 Snyder’s of Hanover, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (2001). 
108
 Snyder’s of Hanover, 39 Fed.Appx. at 735. 
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 five union organizers stood at the “edge” 
of the facility, on a right-of-way that ran “from the middle of [State 
Route] 116 to a line running tangent to one utility pole near the 
driveway and a short distance behind the other utility poles located 
near the edge of the road.”
110
 The five organizers did not “venture 
inside the utility poles,” thus (apparently) staying in the right-of-way, 
from where they distributed leaflets to employees in their cars as they 
drove onto and off of the factory’s premises.
111
 Hearing about the 
union activity outside, company management confronted the 
organizers and, finding none of them to be employees, asked them to 
leave the property.
112
 When the organizers refused, police were called 
and the organizers were ejected as trespassers.
113
 The UFCW filed a 
complaint for violation of the NLRA with the Board; the Board 
agreed, and the employer appealed. 
The Third Circuit, reviewing the Board’s interpretation of 
Pennsylvania property law de novo, reversed the Board. It held that the 
Board misconstrued the presumption created by the law..
114
 In 
Pennsylvania, property owners own up to the middle of abutting 
roadways.
115
 The court stated that Pennsylvania law, although 
“checkered,” conditioned a property owner’s rights over a right-of-
way on what the given municipality itself permitted.
116
 In other words, 
a property owner could exclude hand-billers, or other parties, if a 
municipal ordinance barred that activity in rights-of-way, or could not 
if that activity was expressly permitted by ordinance, but not 
otherwise.
117
 Even further complicating matters, the case law indicated 
that the interpretation of the type of expressive activity allowed could 
                                                 
109
 The lag between the incident and a final decision in this case demonstrates 
how uncertainty as to ultimate conclusions can delay remedy under the Act. 
110








 Id. at 732-33. 
115
 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 46 
A.2d 16, 20 (1946); City of Scranton v. People's Coal Co., 100 A. 818, 819 (1917).  
116
 Snyder’s of Hanover, 39 Fed.Appx. at 733. 
117
 Id. at 733-34. 
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vary from an urban to a rural setting.
118
 The court ultimately resolved 
the case on the proposition that the employer did not carry a burden of 
proving precisely what the municipality permitted—stating that it was 
a legal question, not a factual question requiring proving up, and the 
Board had erred in requiring that burden.
119
 
Notably, perhaps mercifully, the court declined to undertake a 
constitutional first amendment analysis of the Pennsylvania law 
granting municipalities this power to potentially exclude expressive 
conduct.
120
 In any case, it goes without saying that this analysis is a 
long way from the Lechmere Court’s concern with suborning trespass. 
To the contrary; the court went to pains to err on the side of an 
exclusionary interest in a right-of-way, a form of property that by its 
very character is non-exclusive—and arguably of the type captured by 
the so-called Hague dictum, that properties that “have immemorially 




The explicit and implicit power of state and local governments to 
determine these property interests, federal courts’ doctrinal aversion to 
adjudicating land use controls, and local governments’ powers to 
confer rights or require exactions related to the uses of property only 
further discommode the NLRA’s purpose of crisply and clearly 
defining industrial relations.
122
 To understand how, however, a 
treatment of NLRA preemption jurisprudence is necessary. 
 
III. GARMON AND MACHINISTS PREEMPTION UNDER THE NLRA 
 
Two species of preemption govern state and local government 
actions vis a vis federal labor law.
123
 Garmon preemption invalidates 
                                                 
118
 Id. at 734. 
119
 Id. (“The municipality's authorization or non-authorization of handbilling by 
public ordinance is a legal issue, however, and not an issue of fact for which 
Snyder's bore the burden of proof ….”) (citing to Gary E. Calkins d/b/a/ Indio 




 Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
122
 See discussion infra § IV. 
123
 See e.g., FED. LAB. LAW: NLRB PRAC. § 3:5. 
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any state regulation of activity that the NLRA otherwise regulates 
through prohibition or protection. The second, Machinists preemption, 
precludes state regulations of industrial labor relations conduct that 
Congress otherwise intended to keep unregulated.
124
 Generally, a state 
or local law conflicts with federal legislation, including the NLRA, if 
that law impedes or interferes with the execution of Congress’ 
objectives in creating the legislation.
125
 
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 
v. Garmon, the Court held that a California court had no jurisdiction to 
award an employer damages for injuries caused by picketing and 
related concerted activities on state common law tort grounds, even 
where the Board had declined to extend its jurisdiction to the case.
126
 
The Court held that Congress had, through positive legislation in the 
form of the language of § 7 and the related enforcement provisions of 
the NLRA, preempted such a cause of action in state courts, and to 
hold otherwise would subvert the purpose and efficacy of a national 
labor relations law rooted in interstate commerce.
127
  
In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n (hereafter 
Machinists), the employer filed a charge with the Board, claiming that 
union members’ concerted refusal to work overtime as a tactic to force 
renewal of an expired collective bargaining agreement violated the 
NLRA as an unfair labor practice.
128
 The NLRB dismissed the claim, 
which the employer then brought before the Wisconsin Employment 
                                                 
124
 Id. at § 3:4. 
125
 See e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); St. Thomas-St. John 
Hotel & Tourism Ass'n. Inc. v. Government of U.S. Virgin Islands ex rel. Virgin 
Islands Dept. of Labor, 357 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2004). 
126
 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236 (1959) (the Board presumably declined jurisdiction because of the 
minimal interaction with “interstate commerce.”). 
127
 Id. at 246 (“Since the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated 
the status of the conduct for which the State of California seeks to give a remedy in 
damages, and since such activity is arguably within the compass of s 7 or s 8 of the 
Act, the State's jurisdiction is displaced.”). 
128
 Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations  Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
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Relations Commission, a state agency.
129
 The Commission, navigating 
Garmon shoals, held that because a “concerted refusal to work 
overtime” was neither expressly protected by § 7 nor expressly 
prohibited by § 8, the Commission had jurisdiction to act on the claim, 
which it did by issuing a cease-and-desist order to the union.
130
 
The Court accepted an appeal from the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirming the decision, and in its analysis laid out the general policy 
considerations underlying preemption as, first, avoiding multifarious 
pronouncement from different jurisdictions,
131
 and second, a concern 
that state actions would circumscribe the expression of rights created 
by the Act.
132
 The inquiry in Machinists turned on Congressional 
intent, or more precisely, on Congress’ vision of the nature of labor 
relations and bargaining. Specifically, where Congress envisioned 
workers and employers using “economic weapons [the] actual exercise 
(of which) on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system 
that the [NLRA has] recognized,” a state regulation will be preempted 
as regulating activity meant to be left to free interplay between 
opposing forces.
133
 Concerted activity in the form of refusal to work 
overtime, while not expressly protected by the Act, was an “economic 
weapon” deployed as a function of the relative bargaining strength of 
the union. The Commission’s regulation of that activity was thus a 
substantive interference in the dispute that “would frustrate effective 
implementation of the Act’s processes.”
134
 In other words, Congress 
may have wanted no regulation of certain activities in order to let the 
two sides duke it out. Where that is the case, Machinists preemption 
applies.  
The two types of federal labor law preemption are thus not as 
distinct as they may first appear. Activities left unregulated to be 
                                                 
129
 Id. at 133-35. 
130
 Id. at 135-36. 
131
 Id. at 138; see also Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 
(1958). 
132
 Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 138. 
133
 Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S.  477, 488-89 (1960)). 
134
 Id. at 148  (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 
U.S. 369, 379 (1969)). 
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employed freely by the parties to a labor dispute could also be 




It is important to note an express exemption from preemption 
strictures: namely, the exemption for trespass.
136
 This exemption is 
part of a relatively narrow set of exemptions.
137
 The exemption for 
trespass is a necessary result of Lechmere’s holding that the NLRA 
could not be read as suborning trespass. In Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. 
Co., the Ninth Circuit held that Lechmere’s core holding that the 
NLRA did not protect “reasonable trespass,” meant that neither 
Garmon nor Machinists could preempt state trespassing laws.
138
 
Circuits have described the narrowness of this exemption by 
restricting it to trespass cases, for example, in O’Neil’s Market, where 
the court stated that an easement owner is “debarred from actions 
traditionally established for the protection of a possession, such as 
trespass, writ of entry, and ejectment, because the easement owner 
does not have the prerequisite possession.”
139
  
Garmon and Machinists are vital doctrines that still greatly limit 




                                                 
135
 See supra note 129. 
136
 See e.g., 2003 A.L.R. FED. 1 (originally published in 2003) (an “employer 
ordinarily may maintain a trespass action against the union without fear of 
preemption by the National Labor Relations Act…pursuant to the Garmon doctrine, 
even though the union's picketing is arguably prohibited or protected by federal 
law.”). 
137
 See e.g., 2003 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (originally published in 2003). 
138
 Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 784 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 545 (U.S. 2001) (“[W]hen a union's picketing activities trespass 
on an employer's property, the employer ordinarily may maintain a trespass action 
against the union; the trespass claim is not preempted even though the union's 
picketing was arguably prohibited or protected by federal law…The property right 
underlying the law of trespass, of course, is a matter of state law.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
139
 O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Meatcutters 
Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC 95 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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A. Preemption Applied: Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown 
 
In Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, the Court struck down 
a California regulation that prohibited recipients of state grants, or 
state business above $10,000, from assisting, promoting, or deterring 
union organizing. The Court held that the rule was preempted by the 
NLRA and Congress’ intent to leave expressive activity 
unregulated.
140
 The policy posture contouring the Court’s holding was 
Congress’ intent to maximize the free interplay of opposing forces in 
labor-management expressive activities. Specifically, employer and 
employee speech regarding unionization is conceptualized as a “zone” 
Congress meant to keep free of state interference.
141
 The mere fact that 
the state had a proprietary interest in the use of its funds was not 




Although the Court discusses the fact that the state’s purpose was 
clearly to discourage recipients of state funds from actively opposing 
unionization, the holding suggests that even if only the incidental (as 
opposed to intentional) effect of the regulation was to interfere in this 
competitive zone, it would be preempted. Citing Wisconsin Dept. of 
Industry v. Gould, the Court suggested that wherever a state policy or 
action created a “potential for conflict,” with the NLRA’s zone-
clearing scheme, it could be preempted by the NLRA under 
Machinists or Garmon.
143
 Brown is an important case because it 
suggests that a “proprietary interest”—a “total or partial ownership” –
is not sufficient grounds to compromise the free interplay zone 
contemplated by the NLRA and protected by the preemption doctrines.  
Understanding the overarching considerations undergirding 
preemption, and the operation of Machinists operation in particular, 
                                                 
140
 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 62-66 (2008). 
141
 Id. at 69. 
142
 Id. at 70. 
143
 Id. at 70 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 289 
(1986)) (“Wisconsin's choice ‘to use its spending power rather than its police power 
d[id] not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict’ between the state and 
federal schemes; hence the statute was pre-empted.”).  
29
Canon: Righting <em>Lechmere</em>'s Drift: NLRA Preemption of State Prop
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 2                         Spring 2013 
 
488 
sheds light on the inapposite application of Lechmere in easement 
cases. 
 
IV. PREEMPTION OF STATE PROPERTY STATUTES AND CAUSES OF 
ACTION THAT INCIDENTALLY REGULATE EXPRESSIVE 
ACTIVITY 
 
A. State Definition of Trespass 
 
An employer’s showing of an injury to an easement is too 
permissive and strays too far from Lechmere’s concern with suborning 
trespass. A trespass occurs when one “enters land in the possession of 
the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so…”
144
 Some 
variant of this definition holds in each of the states in the Seventh 
Circuit.
145
 It is thus generally the case that a trespass action will lie 
only where there is a possessory interest that gives its holder an 
absolute power to exclude. The grantor of an easement (in the relevant 
context for this Comment, typically a lessor) may convey a possessory 
interest in an easement coextensive with his own right to exclude, but 




By illustration, the owner of a strip mall leases a building to a 
retailer and grants to lessees in the terms of the lease an easement to 
use the common areas (such as parking lots and berms). The lessees do 
not possess these portions of the property as leaseholders—the 
property owner (the grantor) possesses these portions of the strip mall. 
A lease may of course explicitly grant lessees an easement which 
gives them a right to exclude, though to do so would impliedly (and 
paradoxically) permit one tenant to exclude the licensees and invitees 
of another tenant, and vice versa. 
                                                 
144
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965). 
145
 See e.g., Miller Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Illinois v. Graham Oil Co., 668 N.E.2d 
223 (2d Dist. 1996); Wendt v. Manegold Stone Co., 4 N.W.2d 134, 136 (1942); 23 
IND. PRAC., PERSONAL INJURY LAW & PRACTICE § 3:29. 
146
 See generally, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 1:28. 
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B. State property common or positive law granting exclusionary 
rights to nonexclusive easement holders should be preempted 
by the NLRA insofar as they apply to § 7 activities. 
 
If there is no chance that the employer could suffer a trespass, 
Lechmere simply should not apply. That a state statute or state 
common law gives easement-holders some cause of action for 
interference or injury to those easements should not be germane to a 
court’s review of a § 8(a)(1) charge against an employer for excluding 
organizers. If the employer is not the owner of the property, and thus 
lacks a cause of action for trespass, the sole inquiry should be whether 
the express language of the easement (found typically in the lease) 
gives them an exclusionary right coextensive with that of the 
possessor. If they do not, then peaceable, truthful organizing conduct 
should be protected by § 7. 
In deciding the Roundy’s case, the Seventh Circuit missed an 
opportunity to recognize the application of Chamber of Commerce v. 
Brown and the NLRA preemption doctrines to reject the increasingly 
deferential interpretation of Lechmere. Lechmere’s animating concern 
is the destruction of property owners’ rights against trespass. That 
concern would be satisfied by requiring employers to show a trespass 
action would lie as a defense to an § 8(a)(1) charge for illegal 
exclusion. Express language in a lease or other instrument that grants 
an interest sufficient to exclude classes of persons from easements 
would satisfy this requirement. A rightful Lechmere exclusion should 
not otherwise be premised on state positive or common law defining 
an easement holder’s right to exclude in a way that interferes with the 
“zone” of free interplay between employers and employees. 
In Roundy’s v. NLRB, the employer offered a state statute as a 
defense to a § 8(a)(1) charge. The employer argued that the statute 
created a cause of action for nonexclusive easement holders against 
those who injure their use and enjoyment of the easement.
147
 The court 
analyzed the statute and concluded that it did not create an 
independent cause of action for those easement holders, but instead 
                                                 
147
 Roundy’s v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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created a process for those instances where a cause of action exists 
(presumably as a function of the interest granted by the easement).
148
 
While the court’s approach rationally followed the trend in this line of 
cases, it missed an opportunity to staunch the expansion of state 
property law into the free and clear zone of expression contemplated 
by the NLRA per the preemption doctrines. 
It would have been appropriate for the court to reject the 
employer’s theory outright on the grounds that any state statute that 
created an independent cause of action for nonexclusive easement 
holders to exclude peaceful § 7 organizers would be preempted to the 
extent it applied to those organizers.
149
 The easements created by the 
lease did not grant the employer a right to exclude any party from the 
non-leased portions of the property—in other words it did not create 
an interest coextensive with trespass rights. In such scenarios, the 
language of the easement should be dispositive.  
The concepts here are abstract enough to create some confusion, so 
a concrete example may be helpful. Absent an express agreement 
otherwise, an easement grants its holder only as much control as is 
necessary to enjoy the terms of the easement.
 150
 Pursuant to its police 
powers to define property rights, a state could in theory grant 
lessees/easement holders a civil action to exclude those, other than the 
easement grantor (the property owner), who interfere with their 
preferred use of an easement—for example, as an alternative to having 
to defer to, or request action from, the property owner.
151
  
In such a scenario, the owner of a shopping mall may grant its 
lessees an easement to non-leased portions of the property, such as 
                                                 
148
 Id. at 652. 
149
 While this may seem recursive, it is important to state that such a statute 
would not be preempted in its totality, as was the case with the statute in Brown, 
unless it created an independent cause of action specifically against union 
organizers. 
150
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944) (“Thus, a person who has 
a way over land has only such control of the land as is necessary to enable him to use 
his way and has no such control as to enable him to exclude others from making any 
use of the land which does not interfere with his.”). 
151
 For a discussion of the basic nature of easements, see THE LAW OF 
EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 1:28.  
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parking lots. This grant would give the lessee an interest in those 
portions of the property. So if the shopping mall lessee is bothered by 
the RV owners who park in the lot, and the property owner is 
unwilling or slow to remove them herself, the lessee could rely on the 
state statute as grounds to eject the vacationers. Such a statute would 
be perfectly permissible, and analogous to statutes that give tenants 
particular rights vis a vis their landlords or outside parties. 
However, was that statute used to exclude § 7 organizers it should 
be preempted by the NLRA because its use would clutter up the free 
zone Machinists preemption is meant to protect. Similarly, a common 
law rule granting easement holders a right to exclude § 7 organizers, 
absent an exclusive right to exclude in the language of the easement, 
should be preempted for the same reason, insofar as it is applied to 
those organizers. 
The Seventh Circuit in Roundy’s considered the employer’s 
argument that Wisconsin state courts recognized an easement holder’s 
right to exclude those parties who “injure” their enjoyment of the 
easement. But § 7 organizers peaceably engaged in non-intrusive, 
truthful handbilling by definition are not injuring a non-exclusive 
easement, which affords a right to its holder only to use of the 
grantor’s property for a limited purpose, typically access for licensees 
and invitees. Since the ingress and egress of customers and other 
invitees is not compromised, no injury that doesn’t merely treat union 
activity qua union activity as injurious takes place. 
It is not a normative desire to alter Lechmere but application of 
Machinists preemption via Chamber of Commerce v. Brown that 
compels this new posture towards state property law in organizer 
exclusion cases. In Brown, the Court clarified that Machinists 
preemption creates “a zone free from all regulations, whether state or 
federal.”
152
 While so doing, the Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that employer speech was not a zone free from “all regulation” 
because the NLRA regulates what employers may say in the run-up to 
                                                 
152
 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 at 74 (2008) (quoting 
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors 
of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993)).  
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a workplace election for or against a union.
153
 The Court was 
unimpressed with this bit of reasoning because Congress had clearly 
“denied the [National Labor Relations Board] the authority to regulate 
the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by [the 
California statute]. It is equally obvious that the NLRA deprives 
California of this authority,”
154
 because under preemption doctrines 
the states have no more authority than the Board.
155
  
It is a simple conclusion to reach then that noncoercive 
employer/employee speech is a “free zone” that must remain free of 
state regulation. No state law should interfere with this free zone. 
Lechmere itself creates the outer bound of this preemption limit: 
trespass. Except for actionable trespass, no state property law can be 
used as a basis for ejecting otherwise peaceable § 7 organizers. 
The proper inquiry where an easement is non-exclusive is solely a 
fact inquiry into the conduct of the organizers. So long as the purposes 
and details of the easement are not implicated by the handbilling, no 
state court interpretation of the rights of easement holders should be 
read to exclude § 7 organizers. In the Roundy’s case, the purpose of 
the easement was access by customers to Roundy’s store and 
reasonable use of common areas. Absent employee conduct that 
prevented that, the proffered defense is preempted. Machinists 
preemption contemplates keeping such organizing activities 
unimpeded for the free interplay of opposing sides in labor-
management disputes. A mere easement-holder should not be able to 
rely on that easement to avoid engaging in that interplay. Absent the 
suborned trespass expressly prohibited by Lechmere, an easement-
holder employer must either show a trespass-level exclusionary 
interest or face potential liability for an unlawful exclusion. 
 
 
                                                 
 
153
 Id. at 74 (discussing why preemption should apply at all given the 







 Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 
(1985)). 
34
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While inconsistent in terminology and methodology, the evolution 
of jurisprudence surrounding the exclusion of § 7 organizers by 
employers considered trespass to be the line § 7 could not breach. 
Unfortunately, the discussion in Lechmere of an employer’s property 
interest sparked a drift towards inquiry into state-defined property 
laws to gauge the rights of union organizers. As is often the case with 
long threads of case law, each small quantum of decision has 
culminated over the years in a qualitative change. By the terms of 
Lechmere itself however, courts should be concerned solely with the 
possibility of trespass. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roundy’s v. 
NLRB came up short, despite ultimately arriving at the correct 
conclusion through sound reasoning. The defenses raised by the 
employer afforded an opportunity for the court to simplify the inquiry 
in § 8(a)(1) organizer exclusion cases and remain faithful to Supreme 
Court decisions and the intent of the NLRA. – but the court refused to 
take that opportunity? 
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